This week, 20 years after Vladimir Putin was first elected president of Russia, I wrote for The Conversation about how Russia’s place in the world, and the technology used to tell its story, have changed since. You can read that piece here, and a complete text follows. It contains some of the ideas I explore at greater length in my forthcoming book, Assignment Moscow: Reporting on Russia from Lenin to Putin.
IT WAS A DAY OF CHANGE. After the long Russian winter, spring had come to the north Caucasus. The air was warmer. Passing trucks and boots kicked up dust from the ruins of Grozny. The city centre was now bombed-out buildings and piles of bricks as far as you could see.
It was Sunday March 26 2000. Far to the north, in Moscow, Vladimir Putin was waiting to see if voting in Russia’s presidential election would confirm him in the post he had held in an acting capacity since the retirement of his predecessor Boris Yeltsin at the turn of the year. It did.
In the two decades since, Putin has defined what political power means in post-Soviet Russia. At the same time, Russia has also tried to control and define the way its story is told to the world.
In a sense, that process was already underway in 2000. Grozny, capital of the southern Russian region of Chechnya, had been through two wars in a little over five years. In the first, from late 1994 to 1996, journalists had been given great freedom to report what they wanted. Their access was restricted only by their own sense of risk.
It was different once the separatist conflict flared again in Chechnya in the autumn of 1999. The government in Moscow, then under the leadership of Putin as prime minister, had disliked the negative coverage of civilian deaths during the previous conflict which had resulted from Moscow’s attempts to bring the unruly region back under control.
I was there as a correspondent in Grozny that spring day because I had been able to travel there by military helicopter with Russian army minders. In one sense, that was reassuring. Westerners had been kidnapped and murdered, and travelling alone was even more dangerous than it had been before. It was the army, though, that decided the schedule, and we had very little chance to see anything beyond the places they chose to take us, and the people they permitted us to meet.
Something else was changing, too. For the first time, I saw a photojournalist file digital photos from a laptop. I was reporting for TV and radio that day. I could send radio reports via a satellite phone, but TV material had to be sent from a TV station far from the front line, meaning a long drive before it could be transmitted.
Since then, technology has changed the world of international correspondents in many ways. But some things have stayed the same. Throughout Russia’s modern history, its treatment of foreign correspondents has been the story of its relations with the rest of the world.
It was not just the weather that was changing that spring day in Grozny. Yeltsin’s relations with the West are seen now by many of his compatriots as a supine acceptance of US foreign policy. Putin, as he enters his third decade at the summit of Russian power, has chosen to reject and defy.
It has always been true in military and diplomatic affairs that you need not only to act, but to tell your story, too. That has become even more the case in our age, when so many people spend so much time consuming information.
Since 2000, Russia has made great and costly efforts to shape the way it is seen around the world. In 2005, it launched Russia Today, the TV channel now known as RT. It has made extensive use of social media platforms, both to distribute content from RT and other Kremlin-friendly media organisations – and perhaps to interfere in elections.
Within the country, a network of exhibitions “Russia – My History” has been opened to tell citizens which parts of their national story should be particular sources of pride.
For now, Putin’s 20-year story has become one of war and peace with the West. His presidency has already been longer than the great sweep of history which that masterpiece covered. It may go on much longer.
My next book, Assignment Moscow: Reporting On Russia From Lenin to Putin will be published in the U.K. and the U.S. in July.
It tells the story of Russia, and of its relations with the west, through the words of the correspondents who reported on Russia and the Soviet Union through war, revolution, and resurgence on the international stage. It also includes personal reflections of covering a country I first travelled to as a journalist in 1991.
You can find more details on the publisher’s website, here .
There will be a number of events this summer and autumn where I will be discussing the book. I will share details of them here nearer the time.
‘WE’RE NOT HERE TO GIVE PEOPLE A HISTORY LESSON.’ The editor’s succinct rebuke served to curb the enthusiasm of a reporter intent on telling the world about the latest international story in the greatest detail. During two decades dealing with newsrooms, I heard it several times in several places.
The sentiment is sound, of course. Even if journalism is supposed to be the first rough draft of history, the material which journalists prepare for their audiences is supposed to be something different: new, and of the moment.
Yet in an age such as our own, when history is in western European politics to a greater extent than at any time since the middle of the last century, I am going to argue that to hold that view is to risk not telling the full story.
Before becoming a lecturer in Journalism in 2010, I covered international news for twenty years. The experience of covering events that changed the world as I had known it in my childhood taught me lessons about telling the stories of people living through war and revolution: the attacks of September 11th, 2001; the collapse of the Soviet Union.
A return to Russia earlier this year to research my next book, Assignment Moscow, gave me a chance to look again at a country I had not seen for ten years. It was a strange time to be there as a Brit: relations between Russia and the west were bad enough; relations between Russia and the U.K. worse than ever they had been since the end of the Cold War.
Russia was seen as a threat. The poisoning in the English town of Salisbury of the former Russian military intelligence agent, Sergei Skripal, and his daughter, Yulia, was one especially unsettling example; persistent allegations of attempts to use social media to undermine western democracy was another.
It attached itself easily to older forms of fear of the huge country on Europe’s western edge: cold war confrontation; nineteenth century cartoons of oversized bears helping themselves to chunks of the globe.
Part of my trip this year took me to Volgograd. As Stalingrad, as it was known in the 1940s, it was the site of the battle which halted the German army’s attempt to conquer the Soviet Union. Soviet forces, newly energized and enthusiastic after defeating on their mighty enemy, began to turn the tide of the entire war.
The city skyline is dominated by a colossal statue of Mother Russia, a sword in her raised right hand. She looks back over her shoulder, urging her people to emerge from the places where they have taken cover, and go on the attack. The hill where she stands is the site of the decisive, final, battle for the city: 34,000 Russian dead lie buried beneath her feet.
All of this, I reflected, is relevant to explaining Russia as it is today. No, people don’t talk about the war every day any more than they do in western Europe but, boosted by official propaganda which serves as a constant reminder of Soviet sacrifice and victory, it shapes and influences Russia’s view of itself.
It also shapes the way that it sees the west. For if we have tended to see Russia as a threat (even the name, ‘the beast from the east’, given to the snowstorms in the spring of last year seemed to have a hint of Russophobia), then let us consider how the west must look when viewed from Russia.
The west may have brought new technology and new ideas to Russia. It also brought invasion and occupation from Napoleon and Hitler. More recently, it brought ideas of democracy and free markets at time when millions struggled to make ends meet. One consequence of that confrontation is that the word ‘democracy’ (‘demokratiya’ in Russian) is still sometimes subject to a pun which replaces the first two syllables with a Russian word, ‘der’mo’, meaning ‘shit’.
Reporting on Russia, as on any other country or culture, requires an understanding of that country and culture. That means an understanding of its history. In that sense, especially today, when identity more than ideology is credited with driving our politics, we do need to give our audiences a history lesson.
That lesson must explain how we understand the story of a nation, and its influence on the present. That is context, so frequently cited as an indispensable ingredient of good reporting.
The other lessons which correspondents need to heed is a lesson in listening: as you prepare your story, listen and watch carefully to the stories surrounding you. To report a story from a country, you have to understand the stories which the people there tell about themselves.
This is the second and final part of my article, ‘Russia is All Right’, recently published in the journal ‘Media History’. It looks at the way that British newspapers covered the Russian revolution of February 1917. You can read the first part here. The photos are from my recent trip to Russia, part of my research for my forthcoming book, ‘Assignment Moscow’
optimism of the editorial columns
cutting of communication had led the newspapers in London to expect big news.
The Telegraph, in fact, reported on
March 16th, ‘For several days
no news with regard to the political situation in Russia which, however, was
known in well-informed quarters to be critical, had been received in London.’[i] ‘Since Monday no word had come from Russia,
and silence had fallen upon what was manifestly a serious situation,’[ii]
wrote the Manchester Guardian once
news finally made it to out. The Daily
Herald decided that, ‘the information that is allowed to reach the outer
world is often studiously vague.’[iii]
Once the facts were confirmed, the revolution was widely welcomed: the leader
columns echoing David Monger’s conclusion that, ‘Before the Bolsheviks’
emergence, propagandists interpreted the Tsar’s overthrow as positive for both
Russia and the alliance.’[iv] This was not confined to the fervently
pro-war editorials in titles owned by Lord Northcliffe, although they led the
charge. ‘The cause of freedom and of the Allies has triumphed,’ the Daily Mail’s editorial of March 16th,
1917 boldly announced. ‘The one power which will gain nothing from this great
stroke will be Germany’[v],
ran the final sentence. This belief was echoed in the edition of The Times which appeared on the same
day, even if The Times was more
reflective. ‘It is still too soon for entire confidence in the issue,’[vi]
its editorial said – adding a measured note of caution to its categorical
opening statement ‘A great Revolution has been accomplished in Russia’ – before
continuing, ‘but the general trend of events and the attitude of the Army and
of the more important elements of the population justify the Allies of Russia
in optimism.’ Grounds for optimism were sought everywhere. The Times also carried a news story – headlined ‘Revolution in Russia’
– which included reports of military activity on the Somme, and in the Balkans.
It appears to have been part of a daily series. The words ‘The War: 3rd
Year: 225th Day’ appear between the headline and the story – a
reminder of the true preoccupations of readers then, even if much of what was
served up to them was characterized as part of one of the most shameful
episodes of journalistic history.[vii]
Beyond the newspapers’ welcoming change in Russia, optimism was scarce, perhaps
one reason why the Times editorial
also offered hope in the form of ‘the manifest eagerness of all parties that
Russia should continue to wage the war with even greater vigour than she has
In another delayed despatch from the streets of Russia’s revolutionary capital,
the Mirror told its readers on March
20th, ‘‘The workmen express the determination to employ themselves
on overtime in order to make up for all the work that has been lost, and are
loud in declaring their intention of carrying on the war to victory.’[ix]
The Express announced confidently,
‘The Russian revolution has been accomplished, and the forces of reaction have
The Observer of Sunday 18th
March reported the revolution with a series of stacked headlines, which
included, ‘A marvellous rising’.[xi]
is understandable that, with the First World War now well into its third year,
and conscription having been introduced in 1916[xii],
the effect which the revolution would have on Russia’s contribution to the
allied war effort against Germany was the leading concern. It continued to be
so for as long as the war lasted. Then, as now, the Sunday newspapers faced the
challenge of trying to find new angles to the big stories of the week. The Sunday Times of March 18th
was fortunate enough to have the text of ‘The Tsar’s Manifesto’[xiii]
published in Petrograd too late on Friday to make the Saturday papers in
London. The headlines of an analytical piece on the preceding page promised, ‘Fidelity
to the allies’; the text ‘an energetic prosecution of the war by the new
The Financial Times of the following
day was even more forthright: ‘There is now but one desire among the people—to
fight on until Prussian militarism has been destroyed.’[xv]
The Daily Mirror – which had
published the ‘Russia is all right’ despatch – told its readers on March 20th,
‘The workmen express the determination to employ themselves on overtime in
order to make up for all the work that has been lost, and are loud in declaring
their intention of carrying on the war to victory.’[xvi]
This was wishful thinking of the first water. The workers of Petrograd were
among the reddest of the red: just the kind of constituency which would have
been receptive to the argument that the war was being waged in the interests of
aristocrats and capitalists, and at the expense of the workers. The Mirror, which had been founded in 1903
by Northcliffe, had, unsurprisingly, not lost its patriotic outlook since its
sale in 1913 to his brother, soon to become Lord Rothermere. The Daily Express also published the Reuters
‘Russia is all right’ despatch – perhaps showing, among other things, that the
Reuters correspondent understood very well that fulfilling his ‘first duty’
would have the added benefit of getting his despatch used more widely. The Manchester Guardian was another
newspaper in which it appeared. The Manchester
Guardian went even further than the optimism of the Reuters wire, in an
editorial which brightly declared, ‘England hails the new Russia with a higher
hope and surer confidence in the future not only of this war, but of the
It is worth recalling here the admonishment which Stanley Washburn remembered receiving from Lord Northcliffe about the importance of ‘the Cause’. While press barons’ and their readers’ shared desire for an allied victory may have led to some wishful thinking, the press barons’ ties to political elites – such as Northcliffe’s role as ‘director of propaganda’ – were another factor. As Alice Marquis wrote, the British system of censorship during WWI ‘consisted of a close control of news at the source by military authorities, combined with a tight-knit group of ‘press lords’ who (over lunch or dinner with Lloyd George) decided what was “good for the country to know’”[xviii]. While it may be, as Curran has argued, that, ‘The press barons are usually accused of using their papers as instruments of political power’[xix], this was one era when they were largely happy to place that power, real or imagined, at the service of the state.
Telegraph links restored, the newspapers enthusiastically
caught up with the news. The Times
printed almost 6,000 words from its correspondent. In accordance with the
convention of the time, he was not named. The correspondent can be identified
as Robert Wilton, both from his own memoir, Russia’s
Agony, and from the less than complimentary opinions of his coverage from
Philips Price, and, later, by The Times
itself. Its own history, published in the 1950s, concluded that, ‘Wilton’s
service, often important, was erratic,’[xx]
and that the newspaper felt that ‘their writer did not command full confidence’[xxi].
Such a verdict presumably delighted Morgan Philips Price – who, given that he
died only in 1973 – would have lived long enough to read it.
For all that Wilton has not been remembered favourably
– Russia’s Agony, his rather flawed
account of the revolutionary year of 1917, rushed out the following year, may
have something to do with that (the book was dedicated to the Cossacks, who,
Wilton maintained, would soon drive the Reds from Russia) – and the reputation
he had ‘in Zionist circles, and even into the Foreign Office’[xxii]
of being an anti-Semite, his coverage of the February revolution was lively and
informative. Especially given his relatively advanced years for a war
correspondent – Wilton was born in 1868, and so was approaching fifty when the
revolution started – Wilton did a first-rate job of getting to the action, and
getting the story. He was rewarded with as much space as The Times could find for everything he had sent. Wilton’s story
appeared under stacked headlines: ‘Abdication of the Tsar’; ‘First News from
Petrograd’; ‘Revolution Complete’[xxiii]
(one the sub-editors might later have wished for the chance to rewrite), even
though, despite the middle of those three, the paper had to admit, ‘we are
still without news of the first outbreak’[xxiv].
Even though they finally had news from Russia, they did not appear to have all
that their correspondent had sent, or to have it in the right order. Wilton’s
prose gave his story pace, even if the passive voice in lines such as ‘Warnings
not to assemble were disregarded. No Cossacks were visible’[xxv]
seems, to modern readers at least, to soften the sense of urgency. Walking the
streets of Russia’s revolutionary capital, Wilton suddenly found himself in the
middle of the fighting
…as the armoured cars,
which all appear to be in the hands of the revolutionaries, have been dashing
through the streets around The Times office, fusillading the Government machine
guns, all attempts to get from one place to another were attended with the
Wilton went on to tell his readers that, returning
from calling on the British ambassador, he ‘was walking through the Summer
Gardens when the bullets began to whiz over my head.’[xxvii]
For all this excitement, The Times
was very keen to situate Wilton’s coverage in the wider context as it was seen
from London. Under the headlines, but before the reader reached Wilton’s
‘History of the Movement’, there was a paragraph explaining that Andrew Bonar
Law, who was then in the war cabinet, had told the House of Commons that the
revolution ‘was not an effort to secure peace, but an expression of discontent
with the Russian government for not carrying on the war with efficiency and
Covering revolutions is one of the biggest challenges
for journalists. Philips Price even found himself in the wrong place – he was
reporting from the Caucasus at the time – but showed enough initiative to get
to Moscow, and thence to Petrograd. On the way, he caused the resignation of
the foreign minister, Pavel Milyukov, by reporting unguarded remarks the
minister had made about Russia’s war aims[xxix].
Those who were in Petrograd faced not only the difficulties of coming by
reliable information, but also great danger. Wilton was not alone in having
bullets pass close by. Alfred Fletcher of Central News, whose report was
published in both the Financial Times
and the Daily Telegraph on March 16th,
wrote of streets, ‘full of the whizzing of bullets from rifles and machine-guns’.
Apparently unable to contain his own excitement, and just in case his reader
had not got the message, he explained, ‘In short, we are faced with revolution
in the truest sense of the word.’[xxx]
Not wanting his professional activity to draw unwanted attention, Donald
Thompson became a pioneer of secret filming. He cut a hole in his camera bag
to, ‘get pictures with this gyroscopic camera of mine without anyone knowing
what I am doing.’[xxxi]
This was prudent. The revolutionary streets of Petrograd could suddenly become
the scene of deadly acts of violence. An Associated Press despatch, published
in the Manchester Guardian and the Daily Mirror on Saturday March 17th
described, ‘Regiments called out to disperse street crowds clamouring for bread
refused to fire upon the people, mutinied, and (slaying their officers in many
cases) joined the swelling ranks of the insurgents.’[xxxii]
Given the strong political views of their owners, and
the dangerously unpredictable circumstances in which they were working, the
correspondents deserve credit for the picture which they were able to paint of
Petrograd at the end of autocracy.
His despatches delayed as those of Robert Wilton and
others had been, the Daily Mail’s
correspondent finally got his work into print once the telegraph links had been
reopened. As with Wilton, the Mail’s correspondent
is not named. He may however be assumed, on the basis of bylines which appeared
the previous month, to be Henry Hamilton Fyfe. On Friday March 16th,
the Daily Mail, like The Times, published a series of reports
together. Readers were informed at the beginning that the section datelined
‘Saturday’ (and presumably all that followed) had been ‘transmitted on
Wednesday at 9.55am’. Fyfe did not seem scared by the fact that walking the
streets was, in Wilton’s words, ‘attended by the greatest risk’. Hamilton Fyfe brought
the atmosphere of the streets of revolutionary Russia to the breakfast tables
of Britain. The weeks leading up to the February revolution were a time when
‘Bread had to be queued for, and its availability was unreliable.’[xxxiii]
The queues were so long that the people of Petrograd had sometimes to wait for
hours, even during Russian winter nights. One of Thompson’s first impressions
on arrival was to ‘notice bread lines in front of bakeries, and, in fact, at
every place where food is sold.’[xxxiv]
In one memorable passage, he wrote
Bread shops are besieged
by hungry people. Last night I did not retire until nearly 2:30 and I could
look out from the back of the hotel from my window and see the people lined up
in front of a bakery. In the morning when I got up some of those same people
were still standing there.[xxxv]
In the 1918 edition of his book, the page following is
a photograph of a bread queue, perhaps the one he describes. A thick line of
dark figures in heavy coats and fur hats stand patiently and apparently
motionless on the snow-covered street. There were suspicions that what bread was
available was not being shared fairly. The hungry, their patience exhausted, sometimes
took the law, and bread, into their own hands. Hamilton Fyfe reported one such
incident. ‘A baker’s shop well known for its profiteering had its windows
smashed, and the place looted.’[xxxvi]
Hamilton Fyfe explained that ‘large quantities of bread [were] being kept for
richer and more fortunate customers.’ In a forthright tone of the kind which
might still be found in the Daily Mail
today, Hamilton Fyfe was blunt in his assessment of the incident. ‘Such
conduct,’ he wrote, ‘when people have to stand from 5 till 11 o’clock in a
queue deserves punishment.’ Hamilton Fyfe’s reporter’s eye for detail helped
him to bring to life for his readers the Russian capital as it responded to the
news that the autocracy was no more. It was on the Tuesday – as his paper
waited for news that Hamilton Fyfe, walking around the streets of the Russian
capital, began ‘to meet incongruous sights. Here a soldier, rifle-less but with
an unsheathed officer’s sword in hand, there a civilian carrying, somewhat
gingerly, a rifle with fixed bayonet, and farther on a delighted youth with a
carbine.’ The details which Hamilton Fyfe picked out form a pattern within
their apparent randomness: a pattern of shocking change, which mapped the
reversal of the old order. In the same issue of the Daily Mail, that of March 16th, once the news floodgates
had been opened, Hamilton Fyfe wrote of an encounter between a group of
mutinous soldiers, on foot, and two mounted officers. Faced with guns, the
officers backed off. ‘This slight incident showed what was really happening,’
Hamilton Fyfe wrote. The confrontation seemed to represent in miniature the
failure of tsarist authority. On March 19th, the Daily Mail even hinted at the revolution’s
socialist future reporting ‘Order No. 1’, the Soviet edict which declared that
soldiers should be answerable to the committees which they formed amongst
themselves, and to the Petrograd Soviet, rather than to officers or the
government. In the Mail’s view, Order
‘shook the old army to its foundations’[xxxvii].
Even if the correspondent judged it a ‘treasonable incendiary document’[xxxviii],
they understood it was newsworthy.
The reporting of Wilton, Fletcher, and Hamilton Fyfe and
others provided eyewitness accounts of what was happening in the revolutionary
capital: eyewitness accounts which added indispensable context to the
celebratory editorials which were being gleefully written in London.
everyone then really as optimistic as the leader columns seemed to suggest? In
his autobiography, the bulk of which was written, as Rupert Hart-Davis said in
his prologue, ‘between 1949 and 1961’[xxxix],
Arthur Ransome gave an account of a lunch in London on November 7th
1916 with two government ministers (one of them, Francis Acland, apparently not
put off by David Soskice’s earlier concerns about Ransome) ‘I told them,’
Ransome wrote, ‘that I thought we should be considering the possibility that,
if we could not bring the war to an end in 1917, we should have to manage
without the help of the Russians.’[xl]
It would clearly not be beyond a writer of Ransome’s talent to have put a shine
on this in the intervening decades. In the following chapter, which covered the
coming to power of Lenin and the Soviets, Ransome conceded, ‘Forty years after
the events I find it hard to remember the actual dates of this or that
happening at which I was present.’ He was referring there to the way the
October revolution unfolded, but the point could arguably be more widely
applied. Nevertheless, even if those of his fellow correspondents who were
reporting from Petrograd in February 1917 were able to give detailed accounts
of what was happening, the analysis, the weighing up of the significance of
those events in the London editorial columns, was less impressive.
As John Reed showed in Ten Days that Shook the World, his influential account of the
October revolution, the Bolsheviks understood that the British press was
against them. Reed described a revolutionary laughing defiantly at an editorial
in The Times which had thundered,
‘The remedy for Bolshevism is bullets’[xli].
At the time of the February revolution, the Northcliffe papers did not see
Bolshevism as such a threat. Even after the October revolution they insisted
that Lenin’s government could not last. Headlines such as ‘Leninists paralysed’[xlii];
‘Lenin losing control’[xliii];
were common during November 1917. This did their readers no favours in terms of
informing them, in terms of helping them to understand what the west was
There was, therefore, a contrast
between the perspectives which the correspondents offered, and those which
appeared in the editorial columns. In some ways, the correspondents, drawing on
a more detailed knowledge of the country and its affairs than that possessed by
press barons or political elites, did an admirable job. There were exceptions:
the message that ‘Russia is all right’ filed from Petrograd, and widely
published, being among them. The Daily Telegraph’s correspondent also
wrote, ‘Let it be said at once that so far as the common cause of Great Britain
and Russia is concerned, the revolution gives no ground for anxiety—or, at
least, very little’[xlv]. The
focus on food shortages, demonstrated by people breaking into bakeries
suspected of hoarding, gave an insight into the state of the country. It also,
implicitly if not explicitly, cast doubt on the idea that Russia could continue
the war, even supposing that it wanted to. For if a country’s infrastructure
was so weak that it could not feed its own capital city, how might it feed,
clothe, and arm troops at the front? Even taking into account the ‘unseasonably
winter of 1916-17, and the effect it had on rail transport, the system was not
working efficiently. Even those correspondents, Wilton being the leading
example, who came to loathe the Bolsheviks, and to yearn for their downfall,
had not allowed themselves to be blinded to the nature of the revolution, and
the shortcomings of the Tsarist Russian army. During the war, Wilton’s
reporting even threatened to sour relations between the British and Russian
governments because, as Keith Neilson put it, ‘The British idea of fair
reportage found little sympathy in Russia. Even during the war, Wilton’s
condemnation of ‘unduly optimistic’ reports concerning Russia’s war effort was
viewed by the Russian censors as ‘tantamount to treason”’[xlvii].
Perhaps sensing that their publics did not wish to hear of Russian weakness,
and possible abandonment of the cause, the newspapers’ owners, through their
editorial columns, did not offer it. They, too, preferred to think that Russia
was all right.
This was nothing but wishful thinking of the most fanciful kind – as Lenin’s later, and enduring, revolutionary success with the slogan, ‘Peace-Bread-Land’, would come to show. Both editors and the political elite wanted desperately to believe that revolution in Russia would not be bad for the overall allied war effort. In consequence, those were the terms in which events in St Petersburg were portrayed.
Alston, Charlotte ‘British Journalism and the Campaign
for intervention in the Russian Civil War, 1918-20’ Revolutionary Russia 20:1 (2007), 35-49 doi: 1080/09546540701314343
Chalaby, Jean. “Northcliffe: Proprietor as Journalist.” In Northcliffe’s legacy: aspects of the British popular press, 1896-1996 . Edited by Peter Caterall, Colin Seymour-Ure, Adrian Smith, 27-44. Basingstoke: MacMillan, 2000.
Clark, Christopher. The Sleepwalkers: How Europe went to war in 1914. London: Penguin, 2013.
Curran, James and Jean Seaton. Power Without Responsibility: Press, broadcasting and the internet in
Britain. 7th ed. Abingdon: Routledge. 2010.
Figes, Orlando. A
People’s Tragedy: The Russian Revolution 1891-1924. London: Pimlico, 1997.
Hughes, Michael. Diplomacy
Before the Russian Revolution. Basingstoke: MacMillan, 2000.
Knightley, Phillip. The First Casualty. London: Pan, 1989.
Marquis, Alice ‘Words as Weapons: Propaganda in
Britain and Germany During the First World War’ Journal of Contemporary History 13:3 (1978), 467-98
McEwen, J. M. ‘The Press and the Fall of Asquith’ The Historical Journal 21:4 (1978),
This post is the first part of my article, ‘Russia is all right’ which has just been published in the academic journal ‘Media History’. I will publish the recond part of it next week. This post also incldues some photos from my recent trip to Saint Petersburg.
‘Russia is all right’: British newspaper reporting of the Russian Revolution of February 1917
Like all good journalists grappling with the
complexities of world-changing events, the Reuters correspondent in Petrograd
at the time of the revolution of February 1917 knew what was most important for
The first duty of a
British correspondent in these days of national upheaval is to assure his
compatriots that “Russia is all right” as a friend, ally, and fighter. The very
trials she is undergoing will only steel her heart and arms.[i]
This article will argue that while such expressions of
optimism were widespread in the coverage of the February revolution –
especially in editorial columns written in London – some of the reporting from
correspondents did actually give readers a good sense of the way that events
were unfolding; the difficulties involved in reporting revolutions in general,
and this one in particular, notwithstanding. It will consider the
political influences on news coverage, and the practical difficulties with
which correspondents had to contend. Covering revolutions makes extra demands
on the journalist who is already struggling to explain what is happening. In
time of revolution, of lasting social and political change, the correspondent
is also expected, to a degree at least, to explain to his or her audience what
might happen. If this article argues that on the second count much of the
British newspaper coverage – especially the editorials – of the 1917 February
revolution fell short, then it hopes to make a new contribution to the field by
proposing that on the first – the correspondents’ reports – it did better. It
will conclude by suggesting that the desire to believe that Russia would fight
on was so strong that it eclipsed other interpretations of events, and meant
that readers – including policy makers – were ill prepared for what would
eventually come to pass.
and political contexts to the coverage of February 1917
Policy makers needed to know more than anyone, yet
Russia had to a large extent been a mystery to British political elites for decades.
As Michael Hughes has pointed out, ‘No
British Prime Minister or foreign secretary visited Russia in the 20 years
between 1894 and 1914.’[ii]
That changed with the outbreak of the First World War, when St Petersburg (its
name soon changed to the less-German sounding ‘Petrograd’) was the capital of
an important British ally against the Kaiser. Nevertheless, what Hughes has
also identified as the ‘Whig’ convictions of Embassy staff over Russia’s
may have persisted, not least because their networks of contacts were also
limited. Diplomats ‘before 1914 usually tried to avoid dealings with
correspondents from foreign newspapers working in the city, since some
journalists had contacts with individuals and groups that were anathema to the Russian
When revolution came, the most important question for
political leaders and the press alike was whether Russia would continue to fight the
war. Lloyd George himself having long seen ‘the vital role of Russia in the
war’ as ‘an article of faith’[v],
it is no wonder this preoccupied correspondents and editors to the extent that
it did. Unfortunately for the optimists, the Russian Army soon proved
unreliable in playing the martial role which London wished to assign it to it.
There were clues in the unfolding of the February revolution itself. Wildman
calculated that there were an astonishing 232,000[vi]
men under arms in Petrograd and the suburbs at the time of the revolution, ‘the
overriding unanswered question,’ as he put it, ‘how deeply the general
dissatisfaction in the country had penetrated the units that would have to be
to put down the uprising. In the event, the conclusion was that it had
penetrated enough for the soldiers not to do the bidding of the Tsar and his
Like many journalists faced with the challenges of making sense of a revolution while in the midst of it, the correspondent cited above, Guy Beringer, had made a bold prediction which would turn out to be wrong. For the revolution of February 1917 did not ‘steel’ Russia’s ‘heart and arms’. It is true that the Russian Army did launch an offensive in July of that year: an operation which initially ‘made good progress’[viii] – but then ‘ground to a halt as the troops, feeling they had done their duty, refused to obey orders to attack.’[ix] Neither heart nor arms, in other words, were sufficiently steeled. In fact, the July offensive was the Russian Army’s last major action in the First World War. The unrest of the July days followed the operation’s failure. Four months later, Lenin and his Bolshevik followers seized power from the Provisional Government which had been formed after the February revolution. Less than a year after the Reuters despatch was published, its confidence in Russia as a fighting force was finally confirmed as groundless. Russia’s new government signed the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, making a ‘shameful peace’[x] with Germany. From the point of view of the countries still at war with Germany, Russia was no longer a fighter, or an ally. The eventual rise of Soviet power would mean Russia was no longer a friend, either.
This was not the way that the British political or
press establishment hoped or expected that the February revolution would end.
Not surprisingly, the British priority was winning the war, although as
Charlotte Alston has argued, when looking at the debate which surrounded the
extent and nature of allied opposition to the fledgling Bolshevik regime, ‘military and political
decision making on intervention was more concerned with the war against Germany
than with Russia.’[xi] This was certainly the view
of the most powerful of the press barons, Alfred Harmsworth (Lord Northcliffe),
proprietor of both The Times and the Daily Mail. As Jean Chalaby
has put it, ‘From the early days of Anglo-German antagonism until the 1919
Versailles peace conference, Northcliffe ceaselessly crusaded on jingoistic
also had an unshakeable belief in his own political influence. Only a
few months before the February revolution, he had claimed credit for what he
saw as his part in the departure from office of the then Prime Minister,
Herbert Henry Asquith.[xiii]
His newspapers had been patriotic to the point of jingoism during the Boer War,
and in warning – for years – of the dangers of Germany’s desire to increase its
military power. In his memoir, the American war correspondent, Stanley
Washburn, gave an extraordinary account of a meeting with Lord Northcliffe in
1914. Washburn had been hired to go to Russia for The Times. Passing through London on his way to take up his
posting, Washburn was granted an audience with ‘The Chief’, as Northcliffe
liked to be known by his subordinates.
‘I am very glad you are going to Russia for us,’ Washburn later recalled
the press baron telling him
but before you go I want
you to thoroughly understand that perhaps the Times is different from any other paper for which you have worked.
Of course, as I told you, we want the news, but I want you to realize first and
foremost, if you find you can do anything in diplomacy, in a military way, or
through political intrigue, which I gather is a favourite pastime of yours, you
are to forget the Times and serve the
“Cause,” which is more important to me even than exclusive dispatches.[xiv]
Northcliffe’s priorities were confirmed by the turn his own career was
to take a year after the February revolution: he was appointed to the advisory
committee of the Foreign Office’s Department of Information as ‘director of
The existence of this Department also had a bearing on the work of Reuters in
particular – an important factor not least because the despatch cited above was
very widely used. The revolution took
place at a moment when, ‘There was
also an intensification of Britain’s propaganda effort, particularly after the
establishment of a Department of Information in February 1917. Reuters played
an ever-increasing role in the work of this Department’[xvi].
At the time of the revolution, Beringer, ‘enjoyed a virtual monopoly of
reporting to the west’[xvii]
(as others struggled with technical and other obstacles discussed below).
Beringer is also an example of another factor with which correspondents had to contend: that of their own political views, and the consequences which followed. ‘Personally, Beringer was strongly anti-Bolshevik’. The following year, after the Bolsheviks had taken power, he was arrested.[xviii] Other correspondents found themselves subject to verbal attacks and intrigues from their compatriots: Morgan Philips Price, the left-wing correspondent for the Manchester Guardian so loathed the coverage of Russia which appeared in the Northcliffe titles (during the First World War these included both The Times and the Daily Mail) that later in 1917 he wrote of, ‘abominable behaviour of the Northcliffe Press […] especially of its correspondent, Wilton’ – even expressing the hope ‘the Russian people […] will turn [him] out of Petrograd.’[xix] The papers of David Soskice, also working for the Manchester Guardian, show that as early as 1914 he corresponded with Francis Acland, a foreign office minister, to raise concerns about Arthur Ransome, then another member of the British Press corps in the Russian capital.[xx]
challenges of newsgathering and distribution
In addition to this broader context, those reporting
on the revolution also faced considerable challenges in their immediate
surroundings. It would be too easy to criticize a journalist, faced with the
immensely difficult task of predicting the consequences of a revolution, for
getting it wrong. Trotsky himself, writing in his own history of the Russian
Revolution, excused an error made by John Reed, that author of Ten Days that Shook the World on the
grounds that ‘work done in the heat of events, notes made in corridors, on the
streets, beside camp fires, conversations and fragmentary phrases caught on the
wing, and that too with the need of a translator – all these things make
particular mistakes unavoidable.’[xxi]
News was extremely hard – and breathtakingly costly – to come by. The Daily Mail reported on March 19th
‘fights at the station’ to get copies of newspapers, ‘one copy of the Russian Word (Slovo) is said to have been bought for £1000. I myself saw one
knocked down for £350.’[xxii]
Sympathy for correspondents facing immense challenges has not been confined to
those observers, such as Trotsky, who might have been expected to show it for
journalists who largely shared their views. The consequences of revolutions are
far easier for historians to evaluate than for correspondents to predict. ‘Very
few […] could forecast the degree and range of the impact of events of the
February-March Revolution of 1917, the ease by which the imperial government
fell, terminating a 300-year-old dynasty, or their long-term effects,’[xxiii]
as Normal Saul has argued. For journalists, there were other issues, too: censorship; political pressure; and the great
difficulties of reliable communication with the outside world.
This was the greatest initial challenge which
correspondents faced. On March 14th 1917, the Daily Mail published the following news item – if that is an
adequate description. In fact, it was more of a non-news item
Up to a late hour last
night the Russian official report, which for many months has come to hand
early, had not been received, nor was there any news of events later than the
announcement on Monday that the Duma and Council of Empire sittings had been
suspended by imperial orders.[xxiv]
One can almost sense the writer’s frustration in the
phrase ‘up to a late hour’. Yet presumably the item was considered newsworthy
because the Mail’s editorial team
suspected something was up. When Nicholas II’s decision to give up his throne
brought to an end centuries of Russian autocracy, even as the country was fighting
the First World War, the telegraph from Petrograd had been cut off. Donald
Thompson, a pioneering news cameraman from the United States, wrote in a letter
to his wife of his experience as he tried to send a cable, ‘the old lady in
charge […] told me not to waste my money – that nothing was allowed to go out.’[xxv]
For a country which had been relatively late to industrialize, Russia did have
reasonably efficient telecommunications. The order to mobilize troops some
two-and-a-half years earlier had been given from St Petersburg’s[xxvi]
Central Telegraph Office ‘to the principal centres of the Russian Empire.’[xxvii]
The technology existed: the Russian authorities just preferred that the country
underwent massive political change away from the gaze of the entire globe.
The correspondents, of course, had different
ideas; their newspapers, different expectations. Yet the closure of the telegraph office was not the
only obstacle which they faced. The First World War is not a glorious chapter
in the history of journalism. As Phillip Knightley has argued, ‘More deliberate
lies were told than in any other period of history, and the whole apparatus of
the state went into action to suppress the truth.’[xxviii]
One of the main reasons for this was censorship. As John T. Smith has pointed
out, ‘All the combatant countries restricted news from the front at the start
of the war.’[xxix]
Russia was no exception, although, in terms which recall the verdict the 19th
century Russian satirist, Mikhail Saltykov-Shchedrin passed on his country –
‘the severity of Russian laws is alleviated by the lack of obligation to fulfil
them’ – Smith went on to argue, ‘The Russian censorship regulations were thus
comparable with those of other belligerents. However, in the implementation of
these regulations, Russian censorship appeared more lax.’[xxx]
It was not lax for the first days of the February Revolution. It simply cut the
capital off from international communication. Nor was this a problem confined
to this particular episode of Russia’s revolutionary history. Later that year,
as the October revolution loomed, W.P. Crozier of the Manchester Guardian wrote to Soskice in Petrograd, explaining ‘We
are rather under the impression that some of your telegrams to us may have been
suppressed at the Russian end’[xxxi]
and asking him to send duplicates of his despatches by post, too.
[i] Manchester Guardian, March 16th
1917, 5; Daily Mail March 16th 1917, 6
Hughes, Diplomacy Before the Russian
Hughes, Diplomacy Before the Russian
Hughes, Diplomacy Before the Russian
Hughes, Diplomacy Before the Russian
Wildman, The End of the Russian Imperial
Army: The Old Army and the Soldiers’ Revolt, 124
Wildman, The End of the Russian Imperial
Army: The Old Army and the Soldiers’ Revolt, 125
Pipes, The Russian Revolution 1899-1919,
Pipes, The Russian Revolution 1899-1919,
Figes, A people’s tragedy: The Russian
Revolution 1891-1924, 548.
Alston, ‘British Journalism and the
Campaign for intervention in the Russian Civil War, 1918-20’, 35
Chalaby, ‘Northcliffe: Proprietor as Journalist’, 37
McEwen, ‘The Press and the Fall of Asquith’, 863
This is the second part of my post, ‘Two Weeks in Russia’, about my first visit to the country since 2009. You can read the first part here.
The event in Volgograd took place in front of the building housing a new exhibition: ‘Russia: My History’. A number of them have been set up across the country. I had visited the one in Moscow, in one of the pavilions of the Soviet-era ‘Exhibition of the Achievements of the National Economy’, the day before my arrival in Volgograd. It was slightly overwhelming. It would be wrong to call it a museum, for there is not one single concrete object in it. Instead, the visitor is treated to a multimedia experience offering a huge amount of information. I had underestimated how much there was to see. Arriving at the ticket desk, I was asked which exhibition I wanted to visit. I had expected a single one covering everything. I chose the 20th century, the period I am writing about in my forthcoming book, Assignment Moscow: Reporting Russia from Lenin to Putin.
President Vladimir Putin first reached the highest levels of Russian politics when he became Prime Minister in 1999 — but you would be wrong to think that might mean he would not feature prominently in an exhibition covering Russia’s twentieth century. In fact, even Mr Putin’s views on the First World War are shared with visitors: Russia’s attempt to mediate peacefully before the outbreak of war not having succeeded, it was forced to take up arms to defend ‘a fraternal Slavic’ people, Serbia – but paid a high price in defeat.
Revolution followed, and the ‘shameful’ peace treaty made by Russia’s new
Bolshevik government. The final analysis of the conflict sets the tone for the
rest of the century: noting the collapse of the Russian; Austro-Hungarian; and
Ottoman empires before asking who ultimately benefited (a favourite question in
any Russian discussion), the voiceover concludes that it was the United States,
‘A new era had arrived. The era of the dollar.’
The exhibition is skilfully put together for a generation used to being constantly surrounded by audio visual experience. There is nuance, too: some things are bad and good (the 1990s, for example, may have seen economic hardship and political instability, but they also witnessed the start of a business system, and the reconstruction of churches). Overall, though, a number of messages emerge which confirm that Russia under President Putin has taken a path which respects its past traditions, and will serve it well for the present, and the future.
Briefly, these are: Russia has done best when not relying on others; the west is always out to undermine Russia (it is telling that on the section covering the political crisis of 1993, which ended in gun battles on the streets of Moscow, and tanks shelling the then parliament, the only clip of President Boris Yeltsin has him talking of the support he has received from the United States); the ages when Russia has followed conservative social values under the guidance of the church are those ages when Russia has fared best. The Soviet Union’s victory in the Second World War is attributed at least in part to the return to more traditional ways after the Bolsheviks’ questioning of the nuclear family as a system of social organization.
Russia’s biggest domestic challenge in the last quarter century has been to
restore faith in the political leadership’s ability to run the country. While
many in the West look at the 1980s and 1990s, the Gorbachev and Yeltsin years,
as a time when relations were improving, for many Russians these are years
remembered more for extreme economic hardship and uncertainty than for
political freedom. ‘Russia: My History’ understands this, and its overall
message is not to tell people of their history, so much as to reassure them
that things now are as they should be.
Russia’s post-Soviet attempt at liberal capitalist democracy having been judged a failure, the country has struggled to find a defining ideal since. Pride in history has helped to fill the void left by the death of Marxism-Leninism.
Stalingrad – sacrifice, and triumph
The Second World War – the Soviet Union’s part in which is referred to as ‘The Great Patriotic War’ — is the most prominent example of this. Living in Russia for long periods in the last decade and in the 1990s, I came to understand how much the sacrifice and victory meant. I also came to understand that was not fully appreciated in the West. One of the chapters of my next book covers the work of British and American correspondents in the Soviet Union during the Second World War. As part of my research on this trip, I travelled to Volgograd to see the site of the battle which changed the course of the war. Soviet victory here, and at the Battle of Kursk later in 1943, stopped the German advance onto Soviet territory, and, as it later became clear, was the start of the process that would lead to the ruin of Nazi Germany.
The Soviets’ task was to stop the Germans and their allies taking the city, then called Stalingrad. The fall of Stalingrad would have meant that Hitler’s armies could advance on the Caucasus and the oil fields near the Caspian Sea. It would also have cut off the River Volga as a supply route. After a battle lasting 200 days, the Soviet forces prevailed. The German Field Marshal, Friedrich von Paulus, was captured along with his generals.
Today, the cellar – then underneath a department store – which was their headquarters, is a museum. It was here, in February 1943, after the surrender, that the BBC correspondent, Alexander Werth, was brought by the triumphant Soviets to see their prized prisoners. As a western journalist in Moscow – to whom I told this story during my visit – wondered, this was perhaps the first time during the war that allied correspondents saw such high-ranking German captives.
Even decades later, and with little to recognize of the city as it was (aerial bombardment, followed by weeks of infantry and tank battles, reduced the riverside stretches to rubble – what you see today is almost all Soviet-era reconstruction, with the exception of the ruins of a flour mill, left as a reminder) Volgograd tells the visitor so much about the way Russia sees itself. Any correspondent or diplomat, any curious business person, newly-arrived in Russia, should visit. This was the place where Russia changed its own history, and that of Europe. This is the place where you understand why, after the Nazi invasion, the Soviet Union was so suspicious of the West – suspicions which have found their contemporary counterparts. In their telling, danger came from the West in the shape of invaders, and Russia stood alone to face them – eventually triumphing simply by refusing not to.
The monument ‘The Motherland Calls’ was built to remember the triumph of arms. Mother Russia is no longer cowed: brandishing a sword, the giant statue symbolizes the moment when, victorious at Stalingrad, the Soviet forces went on the attack to drive the invader out. As Mother Russia leads the charge, she looks back at the same time: urging her armies to follow her. The hill where she stands was of great strategic importance, and captured at great cost: a sign tells the visitor that 34,505 soldiers lie buried there in common graves.
This great victory, won at such cost, has become part of the creation of modern Russia’s view of itself. Mr Putin even invoked the sacrifice of wartime when speaking at a concert held to mark five years since the annexation (not his phrase, obviously) of Crimea. ‘The actions of the people of Crimea and Sevastopol remind me of the actions of Red Army soldiers during the first tragic months after the breakout of the Great Patriotic War, when they tried to battle through to join their comrades and carried their field flags close to their hearts,’ he told the crowd.
‘Those Were The Days’
This trip also gave me plenty to consider about the nature of being a foreign correspondent. I will incorporate some of the lessons I feel I learnt into my teaching when I return to City, University of London’s Journalism department in September. It was a time to reflect on my own experiences in Russia, from the end of the Soviet period, to covering a very different kind of era in Russia’s war with Georgia in the summer of 2008.
When I left VDNKh, after my visit to ‘Russia: My History’, ‘Those Were the Days’ was playing over the public address system. The tune was originally a Russian folk song. To me, it evoked not only modern Russia’s assessment of its past, but also to my own long history with this county — long enough that some of the other journalists I have known here have since died: some in road accidents; at least one was killed in a war.
It is with sadness that I reflect that the close ties between Russia and the West, for which my generation hoped at the end of the Cold War, have not been built. After Crimea, and the diplomatic conflict which followed the poisoning in the English town of Salisbury last year of the former Russian double agent, Sergei Skripal, and his daughter, Yulia, there is absolutely no prospect that they will be soon.
Russia has built its own system. It has finally – after decades of deliberation – decided on the direction it wishes to take. Freedoms seen as part of a liberal capitalist democracy are curbed. In return, the state is supposed to guarantee stability, a reasonable standard of living, and to permit citizens the liberty to be individual consumers (and despite sanctions, there seemed to be to buy).
The post-Soviet period is over. Russia has completed its transition. The country I knew as a journalist between 1991 and 2009 is no more. Like all countries, Russia will continue to develop – but within the confines of the new order it has established.
Still, there are questions. Can the system, based as it is on the leadership of one man, President Putin, now in the second and final term of his current presidency, endure? Views I gathered during my trip varied on this. The answer, it seems, depends on Mr Putin’s being able to find a replacement – drawn, in all probability, from the security services, as Mr Putin himself was – who will command the respect of opposing factions within the elite. Those factions may also choose to keep the peace to defend their self-interest; there may be some changes to the constitution to allow Mr Putin to retain some form of overall authority when his presidential term ends.
In the history exhibition, there is a quotation from Russia’s Prime
Minister, Dmitry Medvedev, warning that the consequences of the collapse of
Russia would make the end of the Soviet Union look like a kindergarten, or
child’s play, as we might say in English.
The airport and the streets of the capital may exude confidence, but the warnings of what is at stake suggest a certain nervousness, too.
Moscow, Volgograd, Saint Petersburg, March 2019. A grant from the Society of Authors funded this trip, assistance which I very gratefully acknowledge.
I have just returned from a two week trip to Russia, my first visit to the country since 2009, when I finished my posting there as BBC correspondent. It was also my longest time away from Russia since I first worked in Moscow as a TV news producer in 1991. On this trip, in addition to meetings with academic colleagues, and giving two lectures, I went to places which will feature in my next book, Assignment Moscow: Reporting Russia from Lenin to Putin. I am extremely grateful to the Society of Authors for the grant which funded my travel. This is a longer piece than I usually post here. It covers change in Russia, history, journalism, and personal reflection. This is part one of two. I will post part two tomorrow.
MOSCOW LOOKS CONFIDENT. It welcomes the visitor now with
the self-assurance of a capital proud of how it looks and what it has. Arriving
at Sheremetyevo Airport I was as impressed as I was obviously supposed to be. I
first landed there in the summer of 1991 — the last summer of the Soviet Union
— and the contrast could not be greater. In almost every way, that was another
country. Gone was the drab lighting, the air tinged with the scent of boiled
cabbage and the distinct, if distant, smell of Soviet cigarette smoke. Now the
arrivals hall shone: spotless floors, sparklingly clean windows, quick and
efficient passport control. There were more signs than ever in English – and in
If there were any signs of the old days, they were rare enough to suggest
that I was witnessing the end of trends from the last century. The taxi driver
took pleasure in removing his seat belt as soon as we had passed the traffic
policeman at the exit from the airport. He even had a spare seat-belt buckle which
he attached in order to stop the irritating and noisy ticking and flickering of
the car’s safety warning. The old Russian belief that a seat belt is a
restrictive annoyance which can actually impede the driver still had its adherents.
The war memorial at Khimki – in the shape of three huge tank traps – was
harder to spot by the road than once it had been. Since the end of socialism in
Russia, this symbol of the Soviet Union’s greatest victory (marking the
furthest point which the German invaders reached as they closed on Moscow in
the fall of 1941) has been overshadowed by the symbols of consumerism –
superstore sign after hypermarket sign—which now tower behind it.
I stayed in the Moscow hotel where I stayed during my first ever assignment in the summer of 1991. Its name had long since changed – from the ‘October’ (named for the 1917 revolution, when the Bolsheviks seized power) to the ‘Arbat’, but some of the rooms – and I got one, having requested their cheapest – still have the Soviet-era wood floors and furniture. I was especially pleased to get a room at the front of the hotel – as I had in 1991 – with a view of the foreign ministry from the window.
The shine of Sheremetyevo spread to the city centre. Moscow’s Mayor, Sergei Sobyanin, has made the Russian capital smart and clean. A burning rubbish bin outside Smolenskaya metro station made me wonder if that was still a common sight. It was not. In the late Soviet period, cigarette ends – discarded as their owners entered the public transport system – smouldered and smoked in the trash. This was the only time I saw it on this visit. There was not a single tiny piece of litter in the metro. Cleaners rode the escalators in pairs, polishing as they went. New trains and carriages carried Moscow’s millions of passengers quickly and punctually. Station names were also written in the Latin alphabet, that was new since I lived here; announcements made in English.
New Markets, New Words
The sweeping political changes of the last quarter century have been reflected in the Russian language. In the 1990s, ‘biznesmen’ (businessman) and ‘killer’ (hired assassin) were two additions. The first new word I noticed this time was ‘food court’: the English word transliterated into Cyrillic; the concept introduced in Moscow’s increasingly gentrified food markets. From 2006-2009, I lived near one such, Danilovsky Market, south of the city centre. I went back during this visit to see how it had changed.
The charming chaos of a Russian market had been swept away. I was reminded of the taunt opposing football fans flung at supporters of Chelsea and Manchester City when new, wealthy, owners changed their club’s fortunes on the field, and, supposedly, character too: ‘You’re not Chelsea anymore’. Danilovsky market was not Danilovsky market any more. A few of the stallholders looked like they might have made the transition, but they had been squeezed into corners by the advance of globalized good taste. Potatoes, still with the soil of mother Russia clinging to their skins, spilling out of sacks, and bloodied chopping blocks for butchering fowl and fish – all this was gone. Although any property this close to the city centre would – as in so many global capitals today – be eye-wateringly expensive, that did not mean its inhabitants were necessarily well-heeled. The prices in the market were London prices; Moscow’s salaries are not London ones. I cannot imagine this gentrification, good though it may look to a visitor like me, has been given an unadulterated welcome.
Messages from History
Some things were reassuringly similar. The radio tower built nearby in the
early Soviet period still dominates the area. Philip Jordan, in Moscow as
correspondent of the News Chronicle during
the Second World War, described in his 1942 memoir Russian Glory, ‘the great lattice tower of the Comintern Radio that
hangs above the city like a minaret of the twentieth century’. He would
recognize it today.
Then, the radio tower was a beacon sending socialist propaganda to the world. The correspondents of that era were frustrated by the fact that often they were not permitted to file news until it had been on Radio Moscow – meaning that their home news desks had the story before they were allowed to offer it, and raising questions as to the value of their presence. Today, Moscow still sends its views out over the airwaves and internet connections: Russia Today (or RT as it now calls itself) and Sputnik have become symbols of a country which feels it has regained some of the status it lost when the superpower that was the Soviet Union fell apart – but the correspondents are at least allowed to compete.
Yet for all the ‘food courts’ with their sushi and espressos, for all the
beer bars where bearded hipsters show off their inked arms as they serve craft
ales, the appearance of internationalism is deceptive. Russia wants to be part
of this global society, but only to an extent. The shining new streets of
Moscow may impress the visitor, but if outsiders are the target audience at
all, they are the secondary one. Muscovites and their fellow Russians are the
people who are really supposed to be impressed – reassured that Russia is back
where it belongs, and that Russia is best.
Every country has its patriotic pride, but in Russia this seems to have
become a principle characteristic of official policy. The new metro trains are
proudly made in Russia. During my visit, a televised competition ‘Leaders of
Russia’ was followed nightly on the main TV news bulletin, Vremya (‘Time’). Prominent members of Russia’s political and
business establishment (Mr Sobyanin among them) offered advice to young people
seeking to become the country’s future elite. The prize was a million roubles
(about $15,300; €13,500 or £11,600) to be spent on education, but only in
Russia, not abroad. Vremya also
offered news reports on how good Russian weapons were, even including the range
of missiles imposed on a map of Europe, in case you didn’t get the idea.
Crimea Five Years On – No Regrets
Vremya also aired reports about
the building of rail links between southern Russia, and Crimea, which Russia
annexed from Ukraine in 2014. A very excited correspondent breathlessly
described the construction of a rail link alongside the bridge for motor
traffic, which was already open. My visit to Russia coincided with the fifth
anniversary of the annexation. Political leaders lined up to express their
enthusiasm: an event in Crimea on Friday 15th March drew the leaders
of all the main factions in the Russian parliament, the State Duma.
Foreign guests were few, although television pictures showed the French politician, Thierry Mariani, offering, in broken Russian, a message of solidarity and support. It was warmly applauded. There was even more the next evening, when about half the 30-minute bulletin was devoted to celebrations of the welcoming (annexing) of Crimea as part of the Russian Federation: a long piece of public relations about infrastructure was followed by a another report on the visiting French politicians. Their presence may have impressed some sections of the domestic TV audience; to an outsider, the fact that the guests were not of a higher profile served as a reminder of the price that Russia has paid internationally for Crimea. That, though, was not an angle I saw addressed in any of the coverage.
The newsreader said that celebrations had been taking place across the
country. I was in Volgograd that weekend. I arrived at the place where the
event was happening about an hour after it had started. By then, the crowds
were already dispersing. I could not say how many people had been there, but
for a city of a million people, it seemed few. Opinion polls suggest that
Russians still strongly support the annexation of Crimea, but, in Volgograd at
least, normal weekend activities seemed to have proved a stronger draw than a
For Russian TV news, though, this was pretty much the only story for days – and there was more to come.
The lack of recent posts on here can be explained by the fact that I am currently working on my next book: Assignment Moscow: Reporting Russia from Lenin to Putin, which is due to be published next year, by I.B. Tauris (since 2018, part of Bloomsbury).
The book will draw on published and non-published archive sources; journalists’ memoirs from the time of the 1917 revolutions, the civil war, the Show Trials of the 1930s, the Great Patriotic Warm, the Cold War, Perestroika, and post-Soviet Russia. My interest in the subject stems from the many years I spent covering Russia between that first assignment in 1991 and finishing my posting as BBC correspondent in 2009.
Western journalists have witnessed Russia in a way that few of their compatriots can rival, so their stories have, for audiences of millions, become the story of Russia.
As part of my research, I will be travelling to Russia for the first time for many years — so I may take the opportunity to post some news about my trip on here. The picture above was taken on my first journalistic assignment to Moscow, which was then still the capital of the Soviet Union, in the summer of 1991.
The press card below was issued during that trip, when I was working for the Visnews Agency, later to become Reuters Television.
A Press pass issued to me by the Soviet Foreign Ministry for a Gorbachev-Bush summit meeting, summer 1991.
War in 140 Characters: How social media is reshaping conflict in the twenty-first century
by David Patrikarakos. Basic Books. 2017.
PREPARING FOR A TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST in the 1990s, I bought a guidebook which had just been published. The author, apparently enthused by Israel’s recent signing of a peace treaty with Jordan, suggested that one between Israel and Syria might soon follow. Alas, the world has not turned out that way.
Writing on current trends in a way that will have some enduring relevance is a great challenge for an author. In his engaging new book, War in 140 Characters, David Patrikarkos succeeds in telling us much which we did not know about the new world of media and conflict.
The book’s strengths include an approach which combines eyewitness reporting with more considered analysis. The author’s readiness to accompany Ukrainian social media activists into the warzones of the east of their country offers the reader truly revealing insights. The chapter on the Russian troll, Vitaly Bespalov, is the highlight of the book — leading as it does to the disgruntled former employee of St Petersburg’s infamous troll farm concluding that ‘unfortunately’ he too was ‘an actor in the Ukraine war’.
As anyone who has written or spoken on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict knows, it is impossible to offer any analysis which will be universally accepted. That said, Patrikarakos’ discussion — enlightening though it is — of the social media war which accompanied Israel’s 2014 campaign in Gaza, Operation Cast Lead, comes across as one-sided. His interview with the teenaged Palestinian twitter user, Farah Baker, is compelling for the way that it identifies a new front in the propaganda battle between Israel and the Palestinians. As Patrikarakos notes of the Palestinians, ‘Hopelessly outgunned, their side could never hope to win militarily’.
His argument that ‘Israel bombed and invaded Gaza with deadly success, but it still “lost” the 2014 war’, because the Palestinian media campaign was more effective, is stretching a point. Israel does all it can to avoid negative media coverage, but surely it cares more about its ability to win on the battlefield.
Nothing which has happened since 2014 suggest that this supposed Palestinian victory in the media war has delivered any lasting benefits. The killings of protesters at the Gaza border fence over the last few weeks tend strongly to suggest the opposite. Patrikarakos seems to admire the slick Israeli PR operation — right down to the ‘immaculate’ uniform of the ‘courteous and well-disposed’ Israeli Amy spokesperson whom he interviews — but then, that is what it is there for.
The undoubted effectiveness of the reportage is occasionally weakened by a tendency to overuse the weather and the light as a means of introducing new scenes. Patrikarakos’ point about the political significance of the use in Russian of the prepositions v or na when talking of Ukraine is important, but muddled here. ‘Na Ukraine’ does not mean ‘on the border’ (although the country’s name does share a root with the Russian word krai meaning edge, or district). The significance of the preposition is whether the speaker implies that Ukraine is a country in its own right (v) , or a region, (na). The use of the Google definition of ‘propaganda’ feels a little lazy when so much has been written on the subject.
Overall, though, Patrikarakos is to be congratulated on a book which makes important contributions to a number of important debates. War in 140 Characters is especially worth reading for its sections on Russian trolls, and its account of Bellingcat’s impressive investigation of the shooting down of MH17. I recommend it to anyone wanting to understand the way war, politics, and the media interact in today’s conflicts, and look forward to discussing it in Journalism seminars.
This is the first part of an essay which I wrote for the current issue of the ‘British Journalism Review’. Based on my experiences reporting from Russia in the 1990s, and partly as a response to concerns raised by Channel 4’s Jon Snow in his 2017 McTaggart Lecture it argues that not all journalists are too close to political elites — especially foreign correspondents in countries where the elites don’t want to to talk to them. That gives them insights often denied to their better connected counterparts.
Restoration work on a church in Rostov Veliky, northern Russia, June 2008. Photo: James Rodgers
THE MISSED AND MISUNDERSTOOD STORIES of Brexit, and Donald Trump’s triumph in the US presidential election – as well as political correspondents’ failure to predict Theresa May losing her parliamentary majority last year – have all led to soul-searching about whether journalists are too close to the elite. In his MacTaggart Lecture at last year’s Edinburgh Television Festival, Jon Snow described his own background and said: “We are comfortably with the elite, with little awareness, contact, or connection with those not of the elite.”
Foreign correspondents often come into closer contact with those “not of the elite”. While the political upper class may want to talk to foreign media to get their international message across, these are more likely to be rare, set-piece events. In consequence, reporters overseas seek out other stories – those of the ordinary people who will more readily speak to them. Ryszard Kapuscinski was famous for this approach. It was also one often followed by western reporters in Russia in the early post-Soviet era.
It may seem strange, in this era of confrontation between the UK and Russia, to write this, but I have Vladimir Putin to thank for the experience which has led me to develop the argument I am going to put forward here. For it was during his own formative years as a politician – Russia’s troubled 1990s – that we western journalists based in Russia were left largely to our own devices. Senior politicians did occasionally give interviews, but the often chaotic world of Boris Yeltsin’s administration meant that they had plenty of their own worries to deal with.
This was when a large part of the political elite were keen to show that they were breaking from the Soviet past, promoting a western-style idea of a free press, a “fourth estate” permitted to speak truth to power. Russian journalists enjoyed then freedoms unknown before or since. We did, too.
The restrictions on travel which had been part of the Soviet police state were mostly gone. Travelling close to military installations without permission was an exception, as I discovered in 2009 when the FSB arrested my colleagues and me for visiting some glasshouses which happened to be about 20km from a naval dockyard.
Kept at a distance from the Kremlin’s innermost power struggles – as foreigners generally have been throughout Russian history (remember Churchill’s “Kremlin political intrigues are comparable to a bulldog fight under a rug. An outsider only hears the growling, and when he sees the bones fly out from beneath it is obvious who won”) – and allowed to explore the biggest country on earth, we had the chance to learn more than other generations of western journalists covering Russia. Going somewhere that your news organisation has never been before is always a help pitching a story, and travel – thanks to the troubled rouble – could be incredibly cheap. The weak currency did throw up some absurdities. One flight from St Petersburg to Moscow is memorable because the sandwiches in the airport café cost almost the same as the plane tickets.
With air travel literally as cheap as chips, and Russia’s overnight trains even cheaper, we took advantage. There was then a huge appetite for learning about Russia, with which we were enjoying much better relations. That has changed since. As I write this in late March, the talk – following the poisoning in Salisbury of the Russian former double agent Sergei Skripal and his daughter – turns to tension between Moscow and London. The foreign ministry spokeswoman in Moscow has warned that British journalists will be expelled from Russia should RT (the Kremlin-backed channel formerly known as Russia Today) be closed down in the UK.
It was different then. In the late 1990s, colleagues and I travelled to Siberia to do a story on forest fires; to the far north east, above the Arctic circle, where blocks of flats, abandoned after their residents’ jobs went with the collapse of the planned economy, were being buried by massive snowdrifts. With Allan Little, I produced for the BBC’s Newsnight a lengthy report on how people of the southern Russian town of Rostov-on-Don coped with an economy that had largely ceased to function: workers at one of Russia’s biggest agricultural machinery factories got jars of gherkins instead of wages.
On that first trip to Siberia we also interviewed a coming strongman in Russian politics, the Afghan war veteran Alexander Lebed, then governor of Krasnoyarsk. He later died in a helicopter crash, but his growing popularity provided a clue to the direction Russia might later take. The consequence of these trips was that we saw how the country was changing.
It was not changing in the way that many people in the west hoped.